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RECENT CASES
PARTNESHIP-TEsTs AND INDICi& OF THE RELATioN-Co-OwNiES As
PARTNEis-By written agreement, the seven heirs of Carl H. Sternberg,
deceased, appointed one of their number, W. F. Sternberg, to manage
a farm jointly owned by the heirs. He was to operate it under the
name of Carl H. Sternberg Estate, W. F. Sternberg, Agent. He was
further, at his discretion, to distribute to the heirs, according to their
interests, any profits from the farm operations, or to demand, if neces-
sary, that the heirs should contribute money for the carrying on of the
farm management, each according to his or her interest. Under his
written authority to do so, W. F. Sternberg executed and delivered two
notes to the H. J. Sternberg Dredging Company, in which another of
the seven heirs was virtually sole stockholder. After the deaths of H. J.
and W. F. Sternberg, the dredging company sued the estate of W. F.
Sternberg for the amount of the notes plus interest. Trial court held
that there was no partnership among the heirs, that the obligation was
joint and several, enforceable against any one of the obligors, and
that the claimant corporation was not one of the obligors. Hed: Re-
versed and remanded. The obligation was a partnership obligation,
and the estate of W. F. Sternberg, under the Uniform Partnership Act,
was only liable jointly with the other partners. Even though the heirs
may not have intended to create a partnership, the fact that they in-
tended to, and did share in the profits of the business, by law operated
to create a partnership. Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Sternberg's Estate
110 Ill. App. 2d 258, 134 N.E. 2d 663 (1956).
Section 6(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership
as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit."' This definition reflects the viewpoint, now gen-
erally accepted, that it is not the sharing of profits alone that creates
the partnership relation, but rather the sharing of profits by persons
as proprietors of a business venture that creates the relation.2 The fact
remains that sharing of profits is the most important single factor lead-
ing to the inference that a partnership has been created. This is re-
flected in Section 7(4) of the Uniform Partnership Act, which pro-
vides with certain exceptions that the receipt by a person of a share
of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner
in the business.3
111. Rev. Stat. c. 10602, see. 6(1) (1955). See also Ky. Rev. Stat., sec.
862.175(1). (Ky. Rev. Stat. are hereinafter cited as KRS).2 This view, rejecting the theory that profit-sharing is conclusive evidence of
partnership status, was first promulgated by the English House of Lords in 1860.
Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 481 (1860).
SIll. Rev. Stat. c. 106!12, sec. 7(4) (1955). See also KRS see. 362.180(4).
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In the Sternberg case the court concluded that since the heirs
agreed to share in the profits of the business, this by law operated to
create a partnership. This, however, appears to put undue stress on
the profit-sharing factor, 4 in view of the fact that the business being
carried on grew out of a joint ownership of property resulting from in-
heritance. Section 7(2) of the Uniform Partnership Act, unmentioned
by the court in the Sternberg case, provides that,
Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the en-
tireties, joint property, common property, or part ownership does not
of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not
share any profits made by the use of the property.5
In view of this provision of the Act, it appears the court in the
Sternberg case should have examined more carefully the circumstances
under which joint owners of property who are exploiting it for their
joint benefit may be classed as partners.
Prior to the drafting of the Act, at least one early American case
held that management of real estate was not a "business", and that
parties so engaged were therefore not subject to the established in-
dividual liabilities of partners. 6 While there appear to be no subse-
quent cases applying such a stringent limitation on the word "business",
common owners of real property are of course still free from judicial
imposition of partnership status in the absence of express or implied
agreements for the division of profits.7 Furthermore, a number of de-
cisions have refused to declare the existence of partnership status as to
joint purchasers of property even in cases in which there were agree-
ments for profit-sharing.8
4 Parish v. Bainum, 306 IMI., 618, 188 N.E. 147 (1923); Rizzo v. Rizzo, 3
Ill. 2d 291, 120 N.E. 2d 546 (1954). For comments on the place of profit-sharing
as a criterion of the existence of partnership status, see: Mechem, Partnership 3
(2d ed. 1920); 68 C.J.S. 427 (1950); Crane, Partnership, sec. 13 (Hombook
Series, 2d ed. 1952).
5 ill. Rev. Stat. c. 1062, sec. 7(2) (1955). See also KRS sec. 362.180(2).
6 Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N.Y. 199 (1877).
7 Burdick, Partnership 29 (3d ed. 1917); 68 C.J.S. 435, 436 (1950); Crider
v. Providence Coal Mining Co., 242 Ky. 514, 46 S.W. 2d 1072 (1932): Convey-
ance of undivided one-half interest in coalyard and coal company, including
equipment used in business, held to create cotenancy in realty and joint owner-
ship of personalty, not partnership, where there was no agreement for division of
profits; Ford v. Jellico Grocery Co., 194 Ky. 552, 240 S.W. 65 (1922): Purchase
of a majority interest in land creates a tenancy in common with the other owners,
and does not of itself result in a partnership, or afford conclusive evidence of that
relationship.
8 The leading case is that of Clark v. Sidway, 142 U.S. 682, 12 S. Ct. Rep.
327 (1892): Persons jointly purchasing land to divide anticipated profits held to
be only tenants in common, not partners. In accord: Picetti v. Orcio, 57 New. 52,
58 P. 2d 1046 (1936). See also Jenkins v. Harris, 19 Tenn. App. 113, 83 S.W.
2d 562 (1985), apparently decided under the common law, although the Act
became effective in Tennessee on July 1, 1917.
RECENT CASES
The modem general rule in this area, now apparently embodied in
Section 7(2) of the Uniform Partnership Act, is stated by one authority
to be as follows:
A mere community of interest in property, such as exists
between tenants in common or joint tenants of real or personal
property, does not make such owners partners or raise a presumption
that a partnership exists, and this is so even though they cooperate
in making improvements on their property, and in realizing and shar-
ing the profits or the losses and expenses arising therefrom.9
In Rizika v. Kowalsky,10 the plaintiff and two others had al-
legedly agreed orally to purchase property as owners in common, with
one of them acting as bidder for the property at public auction. After
the purchase by the bidder, the plaintiff sought to compel a conveyance
to him of a one-third interest in the realty. In the absence of a showing
that a partnership existed, plaintiff's motion was dismissed as unen-
forceable under the Statute of Frauds, even though the parties may
have intended a division of the profits. The court was emphatic in its
summary of the New York rule:
... The purchase of lands, even for the purpose of selling them at a
profit to be divided in proportion to the interests of the purchasers
(particularly if there is no understanding regarding possible losses)
does not of itself constitute the purchasers partners, inasmuch as
tenants in common or other co-tenants would have similar rights, and
in the absence of further agreements or acts the relation of partner-
ship will not be superimposed upon them, at least if there is no ap-
parent intention to enter that relationship.1"
In Bussell v. Barry,12 the Supreme Court of Idaho refused to find a
partnership in the case of persons jointly purchasing a ranch, and who
agreed to share profits arising from the ranch operations. The Court,
deciding the case under Section 7(2) of the Act,la found that the joint
owners had manifested no over-all intent to become partners, since
each party had regarded his half-interest as his sole and separate
property. Thus, under Section 7(2), there could be no finding of
partnership status.
Likewise, in Ivins v. Hardy,14 Montana's Supreme Court, consider-
ing intent to share profits by joint purchasers of property, held that the
facts showed no intent by the parties to conduct themselves as partners.
Stating that the absence of a specific statement of partnership status
9 68 C.J.S. 435 (1950).
10 207 Misc. 254, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 711 (1954).
11 138 N.Y.S. 2d 711, 715 (1954). For a general collection of cases on the
question of whether real estate transactions of this nature constitute partnerships,
see 150 A.L.R. 999, 1032 (1944).
12 61 Idaho 216, 102 P. 2d 276 (1940).
1l Idaho Code Annotated, sec. 53-307(2) (1947).
14 120 Mont. 35, 179 P. 2d 745 (1947).
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in the instrument executed by the parties created prima facie the re-
lation of cotenants, the court deemed evidence of profit-sharing to be
insufficient to overcome that presumption.15
It should be noted that the foregoing cases involved the voluntary
joint purchase of property, and that in each case, profit-sharing was
contemplated by the parties. Since joint purchasers of property act in
concert, without involuntary imposition of the relation of joint owner-
ship, a prima facie presumption of partnership status as to such persons
can perhaps be justified. The situation of heirs, however, is on a some-
what different footing. In organizing themselves to the extent neces-
sary for efficient use of their property, they are acting in the only
practicable manner available to them. This view is well expressed in
a Pennsylvania case, although the court in that instance was directing
its remarks to a cotenancy among purchasers:
They were engaged in the development and operation of
the common property for their individual benefit. They were doing
what tenants in common may properly do, and in the only way
practicable for them, viz. turning the common property to the profit
of its owners at their individual cost, and dividing the product be-
tween themselves ... in shares corresponding with their interest in
the title.16
These words are particularly appropriate to the situation of heirs
who find themselves to be co-owners of property. Nowhere in such
an arrangement is there any suggestion of a voluntary association
arrived at for the primary purpose of sharing profits or losses in a
common enterprise. Thus there appears to be a valid and important
criterion, until now overlooked by the courts, for distinguishing be-
tween an ordinary partnership and the case of heirs who through in-
heritance jointly acquire property. That criterion may best be desig-
nated as "freedom of choice". As stated in a Massachusetts case:
An inherent quality of an ordinary partnership is that its
membership is limited to those who are selected by mutual consent
on account of their ability, integrity and other personal qualifications
to join together in conducting a commercial undertaking. Freedom
of choice of those who are to compose the partnership is the right of
each of those who are contemplating the formation of the firm. .... 17
Thus, it is suggested that the court in the Sternberg case might
have placed considerably more emphasis on the intent of the parties,
15 A month prior to the decision rendered here, the Uniform Partnership Act
had been adopted by Montana, although no mention of that fact is made by the
court. Section 7(2) of the Act, applicable here, appears in Mont. Rev. Code, sec.
63-107(2) (1947).
-6 Butler Say. Bank v. Osborne, 159 Pa. 10, 28 A. 163 (1893). See also
Zuback v. Bakmaz, 346 Pa. 279, 29 A. 2d 473 (1943).17 State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 41 N.E. 2d 80 (1942).
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balanced against the policies within the concept of joint ownership
expressed in Section 7(2) of the Act. Courts have seemingly found
little difficulty in absolving joint purchasers of land from liability as
partners, even where there existed profit-sharing agreements. If, as
appears to be the case, these decisions are based on the intent of the
parties, it would seem only proper to apply the same criteria to joint
heirs of land. While they may clearly become partners if they choose
to do so, an absence of manifested intent to become partners should
protect them at least to the same extent as those who voluntarily as-
sume joint ownership of property.
Henry R. Snyder
PAnTNmis=m-xirrs Am Lrirrxms As To TmiD PERSONS-ESTOPPEL
AS BAsIs OF L ikmnrY-The defendant and another procured from the
State of Ohio a vendor's license in the name of "Henry F. Lucas and
Clarence F. Roy, DBA F. & M. Truck Stop". The license application
was signed by both men, and the license was posted at the place of
business. Plaintiff sued for the amount of goods sold and delivered to
Lucas, alleging liability of the defendant as a member of a partner-
ship. Defense: the evidence did not disclose that the plaintiff was
aware of, or relied upon, the information contained in the vendor's
license. The trial court rendered judgment for the amount claimed.
Held: Affirmed: The court below properly found the defendant liable
as a partner. In arriving at its decision, the Appellate Court relied
upon section 16 of the Uniform Partnership Act,' finding that posting
of the license was in itself sufficient to establish defendant's liability
to third persons. Brown and Bigelow v. Roy, 132 N.E. 2d 755 (Ohio
App. 1955)
It was well-established at common law that where one has con-
sented to be held out as a partner, or holds himself out as a partner,
he will be liable, under the doctrine of estoppel, to third parties ex-
tending credit on the basis of such representations.2 It was not so clear,
however, as to whether a person unaware of being thus held out had
an affirmative duty, upon discovery of the holding out, to disclaim the
reputed partnership.3 This question is apparently resolved today in
1 Page's Ohio Rev. Code Ann., sec. 1775.15 (1954). The Act became effec-
tive in Ohio on October 1, 1953.
240 Am. Jur. sec. 76 (1942); Mechem, Partnership 90 (2d ed. 1920).
3 E. L. Martin & Co. v. A. B. Maggard & Son, 206 Ky. 558, 267 S.W. 1102
(1925), where a father was liable for debts contracted by his son in a store busi-
ness carried on in the names of both as partners, after he knew that the business
was being so carried on, and when he took no action until creditors were suing
